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INTRODUCTION
The man who is admired for the ingenuity of his larceny is almost
always rediscovering some earlier form of fraud.
—John Kenneth Galbraith1
These days, especially with the Bernie Madoff scandal and similar
cases plastered all over the media, most people are familiar with the
phrase “Ponzi scheme.”  The majority of people know someone who
has been directly or indirectly affected by such fraudulent schemes.
Although these scams can be complex and multifaceted, they are gen-
erally nothing more than a typical “borrowing from Peter to pay Paul”
scheme.  In the broadest sense, Ponzi schemes are investment frauds
that include the payment of returns to earlier investors from funds
contributed by later investors.
Victims of Ponzi schemes usually make the same mistake: they
place their trust in a friend or close confidant who promises them un-
* Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.  I would like to thank my research
assistant, Sara Jo Dunstan, for her invaluable help with this Article.
1. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 75 (1975).
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usually high investment returns if they will “just trust her” with their
money.  At the inception of these schemes, investors actually receive
these promised returns on their investments.  Because these invest-
ments are so effortlessly rewarding, investors tell their friends about
the “great opportunity” to invest, and new investors come into the
picture, funneling more money into the enterprise.  Unbeknownst to
them, these new investors begin funding “returns” to existing inves-
tors; the enterprise that once appeared so solid, dependable, and trust-
worthy turns out to be nothing more than a house of cards that
inevitably crumbles.
When the dust clears and the Ponzi scheme unravels, the schemers
and their entities frequently end up in bankruptcy or an equity receiv-
ership.  In bankruptcy, the court appoints a trustee.  In an equity re-
ceivership, the court appoints a receiver.  Although separate laws
govern bankruptcy proceedings and receiverships, the goals and direc-
tives of trustees and receivers are alike: they must take immediate
control of the entities, cease ongoing fraudulent activity, collect assets
for the bankruptcy or receivership estate, and achieve a final, equita-
ble distribution of the assets of the estate.2  One of the primary tools
for achieving these objectives is the use of fraudulent transfer laws.
Fraudulent transfer actions allow trustees and receivers to recover cer-
tain payments made to investors in order to redistribute the recovered
funds to the victims.3 Such lawsuits are commonly referred to as
“claw-back” actions.
The central purpose of fraudulent transfer law is to protect creditors
from debtors’ attempts to place property beyond the reach of their
creditors.  A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent to a creditor if
the debtor made the transfer with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any creditor of the debtor.4  Generally, the plaintiff who files
a fraudulent transfer action must look to certain factors—which courts
commonly refer to as “badges of fraud”—to demonstrate, by infer-
ence, that a transfer was made with actual intent to defraud a credi-
tor.5  This can be a laborious and expensive undertaking, especially
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (providing a list of duties a trustee must fulfill); see also SEC v.
Schooler, No. 3:12-cv-2164-GPC-JMA, 2015 WL 1510949, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (setting
forth standards a receiver should follow, including a “duty to protect, preserve, administer, and
distribute appropriately the receivership estate’s assets”).
3. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008).
4. See generally UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 2, 32 (1984), available at https://www.stcl
.edu/faculty_pages/faculty_folders/rosin/ufta84.pdf.
5. Stoebner v. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. (In re Polaroid Corp.), 472 B.R. 22, 34 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2012), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 12–3038 (SRN), 2013 WL 2455981, at *4 (D.
Minn. June 6, 2013), appeal denied, No. 12–3038 (SRN), 2014 WL 1386724, at *36 (D. Minn. Jan.
6, 2014).
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because the factfinder must examine each transfer independently.
But when trustees and receivers prove that the companies now under
their control operated as a Ponzi scheme, they are entitled to a pre-
sumption of actual fraudulent intent.6  Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit
notes, “[t]he mere existence of a Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish
actual intent to defraud.”7
Equipped with this claw-back weapon and the powerful presump-
tion of fraud, receivers and trustees pursue fraudulent transfer claims
against certain parties connected to the Ponzi scheme.  One of the
well-defined fraudulent transfer claims that they possess is their claim
to recover the “net winnings” received by investors.8  Ponzi scheme
investors fall into two categories: “net winners” and “net losers.”9  Net
losers either fail to receive a full return on their principal investment
or, in most cases, receive no return at all.10  “Net winners,” on the
other hand, are those investors who receive a full return of their prin-
cipal investment and amounts in excess of their total investment.11
These excess amounts are generally referred to as “fictitious prof-
its.”12 These fictitious profits represent the investor’s “winnings.”13
When trustees and receivers prevail in these claw-back actions, the
winnings must be turned over for the benefit of the estate and its
victims.14
The Ponzi presumption allows trustees and receivers to perform
their duties like well-oiled machines.  They can file a plethora of
fraudulent transfer lawsuits against the net winners.  After proving
that the entities under their control were operated as a Ponzi scheme,
their summary judgment burden is conclusively established.  The bur-
den then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that he or she re-
ceived the subject transfers in good faith and for reasonably
equivalent value.  However, because reasonably equivalent value is
not exchanged for fictitious profits, investors cannot establish an af-
firmative defense to the fraudulent transfer claim over and above
their principal investment.  Thus, in claw-back actions, absent the de-
6. Id. at 35.
7. Donell, 533 F.3d at 770 (quoting Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d
700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 776.
9. In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 B.R. 122, 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
10. In re Dreier LLP, 452 B.R. 391, 399–400 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
11. Id.
12. Donnell, 533 F.3d at 772.
13. Id. at 770.
14. Id. at 775 (“[V]ictims who did not receive payments in excess of the initial amount they
were fraudulently induced to put into the scheme are the ‘creditors’ that [the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Act] protects.”).
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fendant’s insolvency, trustees and receivers are certain to recover an
investor’s “winnings” for the benefit of the estate and the victims of
the fraudulent scheme.
Requiring investors to return their winnings is the most equitable
way to balance the harm after the collapse of a Ponzi scheme.  And
the Ponzi presumption clearly facilitates this recovery, equipping re-
ceivers and trustees with a unique and significant pleading advantage.
But there is a problem.  What happens when a perpetrator’s wrongful
scheme falls just shy of the classic scenario of a Ponzi scheme?  What
happens when nearly all of the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme are pre-
sent, including proof that at least some of the returns paid to existing
investors came not from legitimate business activities, but from funds
infused into the fraudulent enterprise by other investors, yet the court
still refuses to make a Ponzi scheme finding?  What if there are parties
who profited as a result of the scheme?  Can receivers and trustees
still recover those profits?  How are the victims of the fraud—albeit
not the classic Ponzi scheme fraud—treated?  Finally, and most impor-
tantly, how does this outcome affect the collection of assets and the
distribution to victims of these fraudulent schemes?
The likely response to these questions is that each transaction sub-
ject to clawback must be examined closely on an individual basis and
free from any presumptions.  Such a transaction-by-transaction assess-
ment of fraudulent intent for transfers is detrimental, if not fatal, to
the estate.  Standing alone, the substantial costs involved in undertak-
ing independent examinations of the specific facts and circumstances
of each transaction—without the advantage of the actual fraud pre-
sumption—will almost always outweigh the benefit that the estate
might derive from prevailing against each individual defendant.
This Article argues that receivers and trustees should be entitled to
the same actual fraud presumption that courts employ in classic Ponzi
scheme cases if they establish—based on certain factors and other
considerations suggested by this Article—that the entities now under
their control operated a comparable fraudulent enterprise.  Under
current case law, once the court makes a finding of the existence of a
Ponzi scheme, the trustee or receiver is allowed to use that finding to
invoke the “Ponzi presumption” in all fraudulent transfer actions
against transferees. This Article contends that if the court fails to
make a Ponzi scheme finding, the presumption door should not be
closed—the law should still entitle trustees and receivers to a pre-
sumption of fraud.  Why should winners in Ponzi schemes be treated
differently than those who profit in comparable fraudulent schemes?
Why should losers in Ponzi schemes have a greater chance of being
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made whole than in comparable fraudulent schemes?  The restitution
available to victims of fraudulent enterprises should not change be-
cause of an enterprise’s label.  Accordingly, rather than limiting the
presumption to Ponzi scheme cases, this Article advocates for an ex-
pansion of the presumption to other cases where the characteristics of
a Ponzi scheme are present.  Ultimately, this Article maintains that
trustees and receivers should be able to invoke a similar burden-shift-
ing presumption so that those who come out ahead in similar fraudu-
lent investment schemes stand a higher likelihood of defraying the
losses of those investors who lose.
II. FEATURES OF A CLASSIC PONZI SCHEME
A. Charles Ponzi and His Scheme
The term “Ponzi scheme” originates from a fraudulent scheme
Charles Ponzi dreamed up in December 1919.15  Ponzi’s scheme in-
volved “the business of borrowing money on his promissory notes.”16
Following World War I, Ponzi began to tell would-be victims that he
was purchasing international postal coupons and selling them for
more than twice the price because of the unsettled foreign exchange
rates.17  To prove his point, Ponzi sold the coupons to investors, and
then bought them back for 150% of what the investor had paid within
approximately ninety days.18  He induced his victims to continue in-
vesting by faithfully paying them the promised returns within the
promised period of time.19  Within eight months, Ponzi had lured
thousands of investors and was receiving $1,000,000 a week.20  How-
ever, the coupons were Ponzi’s own creation—he never purchased any
stamps or used the investors’ money for any other business venture.21
Instead, he simply paid returns to early investors with money he re-
ceived from later investors.22
Approximately nine months later, having received word that a pub-
lic investigation into Ponzi’s activities had commenced, several lenders
stormed his bank and withdrew the principal amount of their loans.23
15. See generally Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924).
16. Id. at 7.
17. Bald Eagle Area Sch. Dist. v. Keystone Fin., Inc., 189 F.3d 321, 323 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999).
18. David A. Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi Schemes, 34 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 185 (2010).
19. Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 7–8.
20. Id. at 8.
21. MITCHELL ZUCKOFF, PONZI’S SCHEME: THE TRUE STORY OF A FINANCIAL LEGEND
114–16 (2005).
22. Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 8.
23. Id. at 10–11.
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But when Ponzi was declared insolvent, the trustee sought recovery
from the “lucky” investors who were successful in recouping their
money.24  Recognizing the unfortunate position in which all of Ponzi’s
victims found themselves, the Supreme Court stated:
[W]hen the fund with which the wrongdoer is dealing is wholly
made up of the fruits of the frauds perpetrated against a myriad of
victims, the case is different . . . .
. . . [T]he victims of Ponzi were not to be divided into two classes,
those who rescinded for fraud and those who were relying on his
contract to pay them. They were all of one class, actuated by the
same purpose to save themselves from the effect of Ponzi’s insol-
vency.  Whether they sought to rescind, or sought to get their
money as by the terms of the contract, they were, in their inability
to identify their payments, creditors and nothing more.  It is a case
the circumstances of which call strongly for the principle that equal-
ity is equity, and this is the spirit of the bankrupt law.  Those who
were successful in the race of diligence violated not only its spirit
but its letter and secured an unlawful preference.25
Accordingly, the Court required the bankruptcy court to treat the
investors’ withdrawals from the bank as unlawful preferential
transfers.26
B. What Qualifies as a Ponzi Scheme?
Although Ponzi’s scheme was not the largest of its kind, and cer-
tainly not the most complex, the phrase “Ponzi scheme” has stuck and,
generally, has become the American label for investment fraud. In
fact, people often throw the term around, albeit incorrectly, whenever
investors have been duped and lose their money.  And with names
such as Bernie Madoff, Scott Rothstein, Allen Stanford, Kenneth Lay,
Dennis Kozlowski, and the like plastered all over the media, it is no
wonder that the public misuses the term and likens any individual tied
to fraudulent transactions and financial improprieties with Charles
Ponzi and his scheme.  After all, as the saying goes, if it looks like a
duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a
duck.  But while “[a]ll Ponzi schemes are frauds . . . [n]ot all frauds are
Ponzi schemes.”27  Ponzi schemes are their own animal.  Unfortu-
nately, courts also struggle to come up with a precise description and
characterization of a Ponzi scheme.  One court may label a scheme a
“Ponzi scheme,” while another court might call that same scheme an
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 13–14.
27. Gold v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Taneja), No. 08–13293–RGM, 2012 WL 3073175, at *7
(Bankr. E.D. Va. July 30, 2012), aff’d, 743 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2014).
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investment fraud. At first glance, it would seem that affixing the
proper label to the scheme is trivial, as it relates to the victims of that
scheme.  But that is not true.  As set forth below, a court’s decision
that a fraudulent investment scheme is not a Ponzi scheme could re-
sult in substantial losses to the estate and the victims of the scheme.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines a Ponzi
scheme as follows:
[A]n investment fraud that involves the payment of purported re-
turns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors.
Ponzi scheme organizers often solicit new investors by promising to
invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with
little or no risk.  In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on
attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage
investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting
from a legitimate business.28
The SEC also provides a list of “red flags” commonly present in Ponzi
schemes and offers explanations regarding these warning signs.  Ac-
cording to the SEC, the following are typically found in classic Ponzi
scheme cases: (1) high investment returns with little or no risk;29 (2)
overly consistent returns;30 (3) unregistered investments;31 (4) unli-
censed sellers;32 (5) secretive strategies, complex strategies, or both;33
(6) issues with paperwork;34 and (7) difficulty receiving payments.35
While the definition the SEC provides is helpful and may lend gui-
dance to the courts, it is certainly not binding.  Furthermore, the list of
28. Ponzi Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm
(last visited July 5, 2014).
29. “Every investment carries some degree of risk, and investments yielding higher returns
typically involve more risk.  Be highly suspicious of any ‘guaranteed’ investment opportunity.”
Id.
30. “Investment values tend to go up and down over time, especially those offering potentially
high returns.  Be suspect of an investment that continues to generate regular, positive returns
regardless of overall market conditions.” Id.
31. “Ponzi schemes typically involve investments that have not been registered with the SEC
or with state regulators.  Registration is important because it provides investors with access to
key information about the company’s management, products, services, and finances.” Id.
32. “Federal and state securities laws require investment professionals and their firms to be
licensed or registered.  Most Ponzi schemes involve unlicensed individuals or unregistered
firms.” Id.
33. “Avoiding investments you do not understand, or for which you cannot get complete in-
formation, is a good rule of thumb.” Id.
34. “Do not accept excuses regarding why you cannot review information about an invest-
ment in writing.  Also, account statement errors and inconsistencies may be signs that funds are
not being invested as promised.” Ponzi Schemes—Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 28.
35. “Be suspicious if you do not receive a payment or have difficulty cashing out your invest-
ment. Keep in mind that Ponzi scheme promoters routinely encourage participants to ‘roll over’
investments and sometimes promise returns offering even higher returns on the amount rolled
over.” Id.
874 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:867
red flags is not an exhaustive or all-inclusive list of the hallmarks of a
Ponzi scheme.  Accordingly, an examination of case law and the vari-
ous descriptions of a Ponzi scheme is an important part of the analysis.
The difficulty in labeling a scheme as a Ponzi scheme, however, is that
“there is no precise definition of a Ponzi scheme.”36  Instead, courts
typically look for a general pattern of conduct, rather than specific
requirements, to determine whether a Ponzi scheme exists.37
Since Cunningham, the Supreme Court has not discussed the sub-
stantive law of Ponzi schemes.  In dicta, however, the Supreme Court
accepted that the scheme is generally one where the fraudster pays
earlier investors with funds from later investors.38  Circuit decisions
provide more insight.
Courts in the Second Circuit have adopted a very broad definition
of a Ponzi scheme: “any sort of inherently fraudulent arrangement
under which the debtor–transferor must utilize after-acquired invest-
ment funds to pay off previous investors in order to forestall disclo-
sure of the fraud.”39  These courts have also provided this description:
“In [a Ponzi scheme], money from new investors is used to pay artifi-
cially high returns to earlier investors in order to create an appearance
of profitability and attract new investors so as to perpetuate the
scheme.”40
Courts in the Third Circuit recognize that there exists no single,
clear definition of what a Ponzi scheme is.41  Nonetheless, Third Cir-
cuit courts, like those of the the Second Circuit, have stated that the
common denominator among the different descriptions of a Ponzi
scheme is that the schemer uses later investor money to repay earlier
investors.42
36. Bear, Stearns Secs. Corp. v. Gredd (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.), 397 B.R. 1, 12
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Carney v. Lopez, 933 F. Supp. 2d 365, 380 (D. Conn. 2013) (stating that
“there is no single, authoritative definition of a Ponzi scheme”).
37. Bear, Sterns, 397 B.R. at 12.
38. See Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1064 (2014).  Long after Allen
Stanford’s scheme was found to be a Ponzi scheme, the Court stated, “Stanford and his associ-
ates used the money provided by new investors to repay old investors, to finance an elaborate
lifestyle, and to finance speculative real estate ventures.” Id.; see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 377 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that
“Ponzi schemes . . . can maintain the illusion of a profit-making enterprise for years”).
39. Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re Bayou Group, LLC), 362
B.R. 624, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Cuthill v. Kime  (In re Evergreen
Sec., Ltd.), 319 B.R. 245, 249 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (finding a Ponzi scheme where the debtor
“used most funds received from new investors to pay prior investor claims” (emphasis added)).
40. Bear, Sterns, 397 B.R. at 8.
41. Deangelis v. Rose (In re Rose), 425 B.R. 145, 152 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2010).
42. See id. at 152–53.
2015]EXPANDING THE PONZI SCHEME PRESUMPTION 875
Recently, a court in the Fourth Circuit examined the definition of a
Ponzi scheme from four other courts and came to the same conclusion
as courts in the Third Circuit: no single definition of a Ponzi scheme
exists.43  Yet, the court observed, “there are characteristics that occur
repeatedly,” the most prominent being that the schemer uses later in-
vestor money to pay “artificially high dividends” to earlier investors.44
This, the court determined, creates the illusion that the company is
viable and highly profitable, which attracts additional investors.45  An-
other hallmark pointed out by the court is the need for an ever-in-
creasing number of new investors to participate in the scheme;
otherwise, the scheme is bound to collapse because new money is the
only “revenue” sustaining the fraudulent enterprise.46  Indeed,
“[t]here is a mathematical impossibility of continuing the fraud indefi-
nitely, which is contrary to the impression given to the investors that
the business venture will continue profitably for the indefinite
future.”47
The Fourth Circuit court also recognized that because the scheme’s
sustainability requires new investors, a classic Ponzi scheme contains
“no legitimate business venture.”48  Obviously, the purpose of a Ponzi
scheme is not for the schemer to fund a legitimate business, but rather
for her to pay back Paul, who was promised high rates of return, using
Peter’s funds.  The court did note, however, that there could be in-
stances where real income exists within a legitimate portion of the
business, but the court also recognized that such income would be rel-
atively insignificant in relation to the overall fraudulent scheme.49  It
further noted that an unrealistic rate of return to investors, which in-
duces them to invest, is another hallmark of a classic Ponzi scheme.50
In 1978, the Fifth Circuit described a classic Ponzi scheme as
follows:
In a Ponzi scheme, a swindler promises a large return for invest-
ments made with him. The swindler actually pays the promised re-
turn on the initial investments in order to attract additional
43. Gold v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Taneja), No. 08–13293–RGM, 2012 WL 3073175, at *4–6
(Bankr. E.D. Va. July 30, 2012) (citing In re Rose, 425 B.R. at 153; Liebersohn v. Campus Cru-
sade for Christ, Inc. (In re C.F. Foods, L.P.), 280 B.R. 103, 110 n.15 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002);
Fisher v. Sellis (In re Lake States Commodities, Inc.), 253 B.R. 866, 869 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2000)).





49. Id. at *7.
50. In re Taneja, 2012 WL 3073175, at *7.
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investors.  The payments are not financed through the success of the
underlying venture but are taken from the corpus of the newly at-
tracted investments.  The swindler then takes an appropriate time to
abscond with the outstanding investments.  As one author has de-
scribed it, “he borrowed from Peter to pay Paul. And it worked . . .
until Peter got wise.”51
Other definitions within the Fifth Circuit have developed, including
those it adopted from courts in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits:
A “Ponzi scheme” is a term generally used to describe an invest-
ment scheme that is not supported by any underlying business ven-
ture or investment opportunity but that has the illusion of
profitability in order to recruit more investors and to sustain the
program for the benefit of its operators.  The operators induce in-
vestors into the program by promising exorbitant, unrealistic re-
turns on their principal investments through lucrative investment
opportunities or business ventures that do not exist.  Typically, the
initial investors of the program are paid the promised returns from
either the principal investments of new investors or their own prin-
cipal investments.52
In 1997, a court in the Fifth Circuit went beyond simply stating the
definition of a Ponzi scheme, and instead announced the elements of
one:
(1) deposits made from investors; (2) the Ponzi operator conducts
no legitimate business as represented to investors; (3) the purported
business of the Ponzi operator produces no profits or earnings,
rather the source of funds is the new investments by investors; and
(4) payments to investors are made from other investor’s invested
funds.53
But these elements have not been examined by every court within the
Fifth Circuit analyzing Ponzi schemes.
The most infamous Ponzi scheme to come out of the Fifth Circuit
was the multibillion dollar scam of R. Allen Stanford.54  Based on the
following definition, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court was
correct in labeling Stanford’s investment program a Ponzi scheme:
A Ponzi scheme is a “fraudulent investment scheme in which money
contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends or
returns for the original investors, whose example attracts even
larger investments.”  The Second Circuit also provides a good
description of a Ponzi scheme: A Ponzi scheme is a scheme whereby
51. United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 282 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978).
52. Warfield v. Carnie, No. 3:04-cv-633-R, 2007 WL 1112591, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2007)
(citations omitted) (citing Jobin v. Youth Benefits Unlimited, Inc. (In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co.),
59 F.3d 1078, 1080 (10th Cir. 1995); Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.),
944 F.2d 589, 590 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991)).
53. Floyd v. Dunson (In re Ramirez Rodriguez), 209 B.R. 424, 431 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1997).
54. See generally Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2011).
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a corporation operates and continues to operate at a loss.  “The cor-
poration gives the appearance of being profitable by obtaining new
investors and using those investments to pay for the high premiums
promised to earlier investors.  The effect of such a scheme is to put
the corporation farther and farther into debt by incurring more and
more liability and to give the corporation the false appearance of
profitability in order to obtain new investors.”  This Circuit has
found that a Ponzi scheme “is, as a matter of law, insolvent from its
inception.”55
In 1966, the Sixth Circuit heard one of the earliest cases since the
scheme involving Charles Ponzi himself.56  It summed up the facts
rather succinctly:
Stickler’s scheme was the essence of simplicity, not to say of stupid-
ity. At its inception he borrowed from A, then borrowed from B to
repay A.  The inducement to B was a high rate of interest on a short
term, whereupon it became necessary to borrow from C to repay
B.57
In a later case, another court in the Sixth Circuit defined a Ponzi
scheme as “a fraudulent investment arrangement in which returns to
investors are not obtained from any underlying business venture but
are taken from monies received from new investors.”58
Courts within the Seventh Circuit have relied on the following ele-
ments to prove the schemer engaged in a Ponzi scheme:
(1) deposits were made by investors; (2) the Debtor conducted little
or no legitimate business operations as represented to investors; (3)
the purported business operation of the Debtor produced little or
no profits or earnings; and (4) the source of payments to investors
was from cash infused by new investors.59
The definition widely used by courts in the Eighth Circuit to de-
scribe a Ponzi scheme is “a multi-client investment arrangement exe-
cuted over time, in which initial investors’ infusions are wrongfully
siphoned off, the fund never maintains enough cash to meet all its
obligations, and the earlier clients’ realization on investment is funded
by later clients’ infusions.”60
55. Id. at 597 (citations omitted) (quoting Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir.
2006)).
56. Conroy v. Shott, 363 F.2d 90, 91 (6th Cir. 1966).
57. Id. at 92.
58. In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 978 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (emphasis added).
59. Forman v. Salzano (In re NorVergence, Inc.), 405 B.R. 709, 730 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2009).
60. Stoebner v. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. (In re Polaroid Corp.), 472 B.R. 22, 33 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2012) (quoting Manty v. Holmes (In re Nation-Wide Exch. Servs., Inc.), 291 B.R. 131,
148 n.20 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003)); see also Meeks v. Red River Entm’t of Shreveport (In re
Armstrong), 285 F.3d 1092, 1093 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[i]n a Ponzi scheme, the opera-
tor promises investors returns on their investment which the operator intends to pay from funds
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Starting in the early 1980s, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s “borrowing from Peter to pay Paul” analogy in identifying a
Ponzi scheme.61  More recently, the Ninth Circuit has defined a Ponzi
scheme as “a phony investment plan in which monies paid by later
investors are used to pay artificially high returns to the initial inves-
tors, with the goal of attracting more investors.”62  The Ninth Circuit
has further described a Ponzi scheme as follows:
[A] financial fraud that induces investment by promising extremely
high, risk-free returns, usually in a short time period, from an alleg-
edly legitimate business venture.  “The fraud consists of funneling
proceeds received from new investors to previous investors in the
guise of profits from the alleged business venture, thereby cultivat-
ing an illusion that a legitimate profit-making business opportunity
exists and inducing further investment.”63
Courts in the Tenth Circuit has been using the following definition of
a Ponzi scheme for over three decades:
A “Ponzi” scheme, as that term is generally used, refers to an in-
vestment scheme in which returns to investors are not financed
through the success of the underlying business venture, but are
taken from principal sums of newly attracted investments.  Typi-
cally, investors are promised large returns for their investments. Ini-
tial investors are actually paid the promised returns, which attract
additional investors.64
provided by new investors, rather than from profits generated by the underlying business
venture”).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 849 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981).
62. Johnson v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 525 F.3d 805, 809 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Alexan-
der v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 759 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000)).
63. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 767 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting In re United Energy
Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 590 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also Donell v. Ghadrdan, No. CV 11–10517
DDP (AJWx), 2013 WL 692853, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2013) (defining a Ponzi scheme as “any
sort of fraudulent arrangement that uses later acquired funds or products to pay off previous
investors”).
64. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 41 B.R. 985, 994 n.12 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Merrill v.
Dietz (In re Universal Clearing House Co.), 62 B.R. 118, 128, 131 (Bankr. D. Utah. 1986).  Three
years after this opinion, the district court elaborated on the bankruptcy court’s definition in an
en banc consolidated appeal:
One can infer an intent to defraud future undertakers from the mere fact that a
debtor was running a Ponzi scheme. . . .  A Ponzi scheme cannot work forever. The
investor pool is a limited resource and will eventually run dry.  The perpetrator must
know that the scheme will eventually collapse as a result of the inability to attract new
investors.  The perpetrator nevertheless makes payments to present investors, which by
definition[ ] are meant to attract new investors.  He must know all along, from the very
nature of his activities, that investors at the end of the line will lose their money.
Barber v. Union Nat’l Bank of Macomb (In re KZK Livestock, Inc.), 190 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843,
860 (D. Utah 1995)).
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In 2008, the Tenth Circuit expounded on this definition:
A Ponzi scheme is “[a] fraudulent investment scheme in which
money contributed by later investors generates artificially high divi-
dends for the original investors, whose example attracts even larger
investments.  Money from the new investors is used directly to re-
pay or pay interest to earlier investors, usually without any opera-
tion or revenue-producing activity other than the continual raising
of new funds.”65
Courts in the Tenth Circuit now appear to follow a hybrid of these
definitions.  For example, in a recent decision, the bankruptcy court
for the District of Utah stated that there are four characteristics of a
Ponzi scheme: (1) returns to investors are not financed through the
success of the underlying business venture; (2) the returns to investors
are taken from newly attracted investments; (3) investors are prom-
ised large returns; and (4) initial investors receive promised returns,
which attracts additional investors.66
Finally, in 2011, an Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy court provided the
following description of a Ponzi scheme:
[a] phony investment plan in which monies paid by later investors
are used to pay artificially high returns to the initial investors, with
the goal of attracting more investors.  In order to prove the exis-
tence of a Ponzi scheme, the trustee must establish that: (1) deposits
were made by investors; (2) the debtors conducted little or no legiti-
mate business operations as represented to investors; (3) the pur-
ported business operations of the debtors produced little or no
profits or earnings; and (4) the source of payments to investors was
from cash infused by new investors.67
It would be imprudent to attempt to summarize the definitions and
descriptions of a classic Ponzi scheme.  Courts around the country
have defined it in various ways, and even within each circuit, it ap-
pears that several definitions and characteristics are used.  Indeed,
some courts provide that a Ponzi scheme only exists when the “returns
to investors are not obtained from any underlying business venture,”
but instead are taken solely from funds “received from new inves-
tors.”68  Yet, there are other courts that recognize that Ponzi schemes
65. Mosier v. Callister, Nebeker & McCullough, P.C., 546 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.2 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004)).
66. Gillman v. Ponzi Issue (In re Twin Peaks Fin. Servs.), Nos. 07-25399, 07-25401, 2012 WL
3309715, at *5 (Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 13, 2012).
67. Kapila v. Phillips Buick–Pontiac–GMC Truck, Inc. (In re ATM Fin. Servs., LLC), No.
6:08–bk–969–KSJ, 2011 WL 2580763, at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. June 24, 2011) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Wiand v. Waxenberg, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
68. In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 978 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 1993) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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may involve some legitimate investment opportunities.69  Some courts
also state that Ponzi schemes are, by definition, insolvent at all
times.70  Still other courts have found a Ponzi scheme to exist despite
the fact that the enterprise originated from a legitimate, solvent
business.71
Notwithstanding the varying descriptions of a Ponzi scheme, and, in
some cases, the contradictions, there appears to be one common
thread among all courts: a Ponzi scheme requires proof that returns
paid to existing investors came from funds infused into the fraudulent
scheme by later investors.  But beyond that, there is no reliable
method or test to predict whether a court will label a fraudulent in-
vestment scheme as a Ponzi scheme.  This uncertainty becomes partic-
ularly problematic when trustees and receivers initiate fraudulent
transfer lawsuits to recover assets for the benefit of the estate.
III. THE PONZI SCHEME PRESUMPTION
A. Bankruptcy and Receiverships
The bankruptcy and receivership processes are used frequently to
redress the consequences of a failed Ponzi scheme or similar invest-
ment fraud in order to provide some relief to unsatisfied creditors of
the scheme.72  Recently, the Second Circuit reaffirmed that an equity
receivership “accomplishes what a bankruptcy would” when dealing
with financial fraud arising out of a Ponzi scheme.73  Yet, there are
some distinct differences between the two which are worth discussing.
Unlike bankruptcy, where Congress has spoken by setting forth a
broad and detailed statute to guide the courts and bankruptcy trustees
69. See Gold v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Taneja), No. 08–13293–RGM, 2012 WL 3073175, at *7
(Bankr. E.D. Va. July 30, 2012) (stating that “[l]egitimate income from the legitimate portion of
the business, if any, is insignificant,” and that “[t]o the extent that there is a legitimate business
venture, it is a veneer masking a fraud”).
70. Picard v. Madoff (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 458 B.R. 87, 110 n.15 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that a Ponzi
scheme “is, as a matter of law, insolvent from its inception”); Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep.
Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 1987) (noting that “[b]y definition, an enterprise
engaged in a Ponzi scheme is insolvent from day one”).
71. In re Bonham, 251 B.R. 113, 135–36 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2000) (recognizing that “most
Ponzi schemes have a least a semblance, if not a somewhat substantial, operating ‘front’” and
that it is incorrect to state that a Ponzi operator is inherently insolvent at all times).
72. See, e.g., SEC v. Huber, 702 F.3d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “Ponzi schemes
often end in bankruptcy court”); Hewitt v. Westover, 158 N.E. 631, 633–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 1927)
(stating that the “[d]efendants knew that said company was a fraud and was being operated for
fraudulent purposes, knew that it was insolvent, knew that its liabilities far exceeded its assets,
and knew it was subject to be placed in bankruptcy or receivership at any time”).
73. SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 92 (2d. Cir. 2010).
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in the disposition of such cases, an equity receiver’s authority is estab-
lished by the “extremely broad” power of the court.74  Indeed, “[i]t is
a recognized principle of law that the district court has broad powers
and wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in an equity
receivership.”75  As noted by the Ninth Circuit, “The basis for broad
deference to the district court’s supervisory role in equity receiver-
ships arises out of the fact that most receiverships involve multiple
parties and complex transactions.”76  Because of this broad power and
the lack of any statutory framework, the rights of creditors and, partic-
ularly, victims of fraudulent schemes are arguably less certain under
an equitable receivership than they might be under bankruptcy law.
Furthermore, the justification for the appointment of a receiver is
generally based on the SEC establishing a prima facie case of fraud
and mismanagement.77  However, in every bankruptcy case, a trustee
is automatically appointed or, in the alternative, the debtor remains in
control of its business as a debtor-in-possession.78  Similarly, for in-
junctive relief in a receivership case, the SEC must establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence “that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the defendant is engaged or about to engage in practices that violate
the federal securities laws.”79  But the filing of a bankruptcy petition
automatically stays—that is, it “restrains[ ] creditors from taking fur-
ther action against the debtor, the property of the debtor, or the prop-
erty of the estate to collect their claims.”80
Despite these differences, “[t]he goal in both securities[ ]fraud re-
ceiverships and liquidation bankruptcy is identical—the fair distribu-
tion of the liquidated assets.”81  To that end, there are certainly more
parallels between the two than contrasts.  For example, similar to the
steward of the bankruptcy estate—a trustee under Chapter 7 or a
debtor-in-possession under Chapter 1182—an equity receiver is a neu-
74. See id.
75. SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 577 F.2d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 1978).
76. SEC v. Hardy, 803 F.2d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1986).
77. See SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963) (“The district court was vested
with inherent equitable power to appoint a trustee–receiver under the facts of this case.  The
prima facie showing of fraud and mismanagement, absent insolvency, is enough to call into play
the equitable powers of the court.”).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2012).  In certain Chapter 11 cases—certainly any involving financial
fraud or Ponzi-like characteristics—the debtor-in-possession may be removed from its position
of authority and replaced by a Chapter 11 trustee, who then resumes control of the debtor. Id.
§ 1104(a).
79. SEC v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., 645 F.2d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1981).
80. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 44 (8th ed. 2013).
81. SEC v. Wealth Mgmt. LLC, 628 F.3d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 2010).
82. In every Chapter 7 case, a trustee is appointed.  The Chapter 7 trustee is an impartial
person representing the collective interest of the debtor’s creditors.  A Chapter 7 trustee is ac-
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tral officer of the court appointed to marshal assets and determine
claims subject to the district court’s instructions and approval.83 The
Sixth Circuit explained as follows:
The receiver’s role, and the district court’s purpose in the appoint-
ment, is to safeguard the disputed assets, administer the property as
suitable, and to assist the district court in achieving a final, equitable
distribution of the assets if necessary.  As an officer of the court, the
receiver’s powers are coextensive with his order of appointment.84
The Second Circuit commented similarly:
Receivers appointed at the SEC’s request are equipped with a
variety of tools to help preserve the status quo while the various
transactions are unraveled . . . to obtain an accurate picture of what
transpired. We have observed that a primary purpose of appointing
a receiver is to conserve the existing estate. Receivers are directed
to marshal the assets of the defendant, and prevent the dissipation
of the defendant’s assets pending further action by the court.  This
authority necessarily includes the power to investigate the defen-
dant’s transactions.85
These duties, as articulated by the Sixth and Second Circuits, are akin
to that of a trustee, who is likewise charged with collecting and reduc-
ing to money the property of the estate.86  Moreover, similar to a re-
ceiver in an equity receivership, in bankruptcy liquidation, it is
ultimately the trustee’s duty to collect property of the estate “as expe-
ditiously as is compatible with the best interests of the parties in inter-
est.”87  In fact, “[t]he provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing
trustees are often relied upon for guidance in . . . receivership cases.”88
tive, controlling and administering the bankruptcy estate as the representative of the estate.  The
trustee is essentially the successor of the debtor to collect and reduce to money the property of
the estate.  The trustee also represents the creditors. In that capacity, he may exercise rights that
would have belonged to creditors before the beginning of the bankruptcy case.  11 U.S.C. § 323.
Section 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code grants a debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case all
the rights and imposes all the duties of a trustee. Id. § 1107(a).  Thus, just like a Chapter 7
trustee, a debtor-in-possession can exercise avoidance powers such as fraudulent transfer and
preference lawsuits.  Furthermore, by operation of law, a receiver appointed to ascertain the
financial condition of entities involved in an alleged Ponzi scheme would automatically become
the debtor-in-possession in the event of a bankruptcy filing. SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 93 (2d.
Cir. 2010).
83. SEC v. Sharp Capital, Inc., No. Civ.A.398-CV-2792-M, 2001 WL 169722, at *5 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 16, 2001).
84. Liberte Capital Grp., LLC v. Capwill, 462 F.3d 543, 551 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
85. Eberhard v. Marcu, 530 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1).
87. Id.
88. SEC v. Kirkland, No. 6:06–cv–183–Orl–28KRS, 2008 WL 4491528, at *9 n.10 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 30, 2008) (emphasis added).
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Additionally, “[t]he receivership protects the assets of the estate,
just as a stay would in bankruptcy.”89  In this way, “equitable powers
of the receivership court are similar to the powers of the bankruptcy
court.”90  Further, district courts when supervising receiverships also
have the power to subordinate the claims of certain investors in finan-
cial investment schemes to ensure their equal treatment.91  And the
Bankruptcy Code codifies a similar doctrine of equitable subordina-
tion, granting bankruptcy courts the power to subordinate certain
claims.92  Finally, and particularly with respect to fraudulent invest-
ment schemes, the law charges both the equity receiver and the bank-
ruptcy trustee with the same duty to maximize the estate for the
benefit of the victims and any creditors.93
Thus, if, as the courts say, the primary goal in both securities fraud
receiverships and liquidation bankruptcy is identical (i.e., the fair dis-
tribution of the liquidated assets), then the tools provided to the eq-
uity receiver and the trustee in bankruptcy to regain the investments
acquired and dissipated by the perpetrators of the financial scheme
must also be on equal footing. The use of fraudulent transfer laws
helps to achieve this objective.
B. The Ponzi Scheme Presumption Under Fraudulent Transfer Law
To unravel the fraudulent scheme and provide relief to the victims,
receivers and trustees often bring lawsuits to “claw back” the fraudu-
lent transfer of funds belonging to the receivership or bankruptcy es-
tate.94  The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota described
this general claw-back process:
89. SEC v. Byers, 609 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).
90. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Jeffries, 653 F.3d 755, 762 (8th Cir. 2011).
91. SEC v. Wealth Mgmt. LLC, 628 F.3d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 2010).
92. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2012).
93. See, e.g., Kalyna v. Swaine (In re Accomazzo), 226 B.R. 426, 429 (D. Ariz. 1998) (stating
that “[p]art of the bankruptcy trustee’s fiduciary duty is to conserve assets of the estate and
maximize distributions to creditors”); Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that “[the receiver’s] only object is to maximize the value of the corporations for the benefit
of their investors and any creditors”).
94. It is important to note that a trustee in bankruptcy, or debtor-in-possession, has two statu-
tory tools that enable her to claw back funds from creditors who received disbursements prior to
bankruptcy: fraudulent transfers and preferential transfers.  This Article does not concern pref-
erential transfers because the Ponzi presumption is not applicable to such transfers.  It should be
noted, however, that a preference action’s burden of proof is much lower than that in fraudulent
transfer actions because any funds transferred by the debtor to a creditor within ninety days of
the bankruptcy filing are unlawful preferences and, absent a defense, must be returned to the
estate.  The problem, nonetheless, with preference lawsuits is that, in Ponzi schemes or similar
fraudulent investment schemes, most of the transfers occur outside the ninety-day time period.
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Via “clawback,” a trustee or receiver puts all parties that transacted
with the purveyor of a failed Ponzi scheme onto a parity in the mat-
ter of restitution.  This would be done by invoking remedies of
avoidance (under theories of fraudulent transfer, unjust enrichment,
and the like) against those lenders and investors who got repaid in
whole or in part before the collapse.  The extant wreckage of the
scheme, i.e., the property that had remained in-hand with the pur-
veyor as of the collapse, would be augmented by recoveries of funds
from those lenders and investors who got out early.  The identity of
parties subject to the trustee’s claims would be fixed by a temporal
measurement, as those that had been paid during the periods of vul-
nerability to avoidance or recovery specified by the law of fraudu-
lent transfer or other invoked remedies.  Those with debts
unsatisfied at the downfall would share pro rata with those whose
claims would perforce be revived via the avoidance of the payments
to them and the recovery from them of corresponding amounts of
money.95
When it comes to Ponzi schemes, “[c]ourts have routinely applied
[the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)] to allow receivers or
trustees in bankruptcy to recover monies lost by Ponzi-scheme inves-
tors.”96  “The Ponzi scheme operator is the ‘debtor,’ and each investor
is a ‘creditor.’”97  “The profiting investors are the recipients of the
Ponzi scheme operator’s fraudulent transfer.”98  These profiting inves-
tors are oftentimes referred to as “winners” and the profits they re-
ceive are typically referred to as “fictitious profits.”99
Under UFTA, payments to “innocent investors” are avoidable as
fraudulent transfers to the extent those investors “received payments
in excess of the amounts of principal that they originally invested.”100
As the Ninth Circuit explained, “The policy justification is ratable dis-
tribution of remaining assets among all the defrauded investors.”101
Hence, “[t]he ‘winners’ in the Ponzi scheme, even if innocent of any
fraud themselves, should not be permitted to ‘enjoy an advantage over
later investors sucked into the Ponzi scheme who were not so
95. Kelly v. Hofer (In re Petters Co.), 440 B.R. 805, 806 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010).
96. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2008).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Picard v. Cohmad Sec. Corp. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 454 B.R. 317,
325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that “[n]one of the purported purchases of securities in the
. . . customer accounts actually occurred, however, and the reported gains were entirely fictitious
(‘Fictitious Profits’)”); see also Donell, 533 F.3d at 766–67 (stating that “[t]he ‘winners’ in the
Ponzi scheme, even if innocent of any fraud themselves, should not be permitted to enjoy an
advantage over later investors sucked into the Ponzi scheme who were not so lucky” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
100. Donell, 533 F.3d at 770.
101. Id.
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lucky.’”102  To meet this goal—to essentially put all parties that trans-
acted with the schemer onto parity in restitution—those “lucky” in-
vestors who got out early are legally obligated to pay into the
receivership or bankruptcy estate and then share pro rata with all of
the other victims of the scheme.  After all, “[a]ll [the winning investor]
is being asked to do is to return the net profits of his investment—the
difference between what he put in at the beginning and what he had at
the end.”103
UFTA provides for two theories under which a receiver or bank-
ruptcy trustee may collect assets for the benefit of creditors and vic-
tims: “actual fraud” and “constructive fraud.”104  The court may allow
avoidance under the actual fraud theory on proof of only one element:
the debtor (the Ponzi scheme operator) made transfers to the trans-
feree (the winning investor) “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud” the creditors (the losing investors).105
Generally, a creditor who files a fraudulent transfer action must
look to the factors enumerated in the UFTA—known as the “badges
of fraud”—to prove actual intent.106  But there is a general rule—
known as the “Ponzi scheme presumption”—that when the debtor en-
gages in a Ponzi scheme, proof of that scheme satisfies “actual intent”
as a matter of law because “transfers made in the course of a Ponzi
operation could have been made for no purpose other than to hinder,
102. Id. (quoting In re United Energy Corp., 944 F.2d 589, 596 (9th Cir. 1991)); see also
Stoebner v. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. (In re Polaroid Corp.), 472 B.R. 22, 33–34 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2012) (stating that “the notion behind the use of avoidance remedies against a satisfied,
earlier investor is that its payment was made with money of later victim–investors, and very
much to the detriment of them, their contemporaneous fellow-creditors, and future creditors of
the entities purveying the scheme”).
103. Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 757–58 (7th Cir. 1995).
104. See generally UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4 (1984).  This Article analyzes the
Ponzi scheme presumption, which deals with the “actual fraud” component of the UFTA. The
constructive fraud alternative is not as straightforward.  A transfer is fraudulent under a theory
of constructive fraud if the transferor does not receive reasonable value in exchange and the
transferor either (1) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which
the remaining assets of the transferor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction; (2) intended to, believed, or reasonably should have believed that he or she would
incur debts beyond his or her ability to pay them as they became due; or (3) was insolvent at the
time of the transfer. Id.  However, although more complicated and, at times, difficult to prove,
“whether the receiver seeks to recover from winning investors under the actual fraud or con-
structive fraud theories generally does not impact the amount of recovery from innocent inves-
tors.” Donell, 533 F.3d at 771.
105. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4 (stating that a transfer made by a debtor is
fraudulent to a creditor if the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any creditor of the debtor”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012) (providing that a
bankruptcy trustee may avoid any transfer if it was made “with the actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud any entity”).
106. In re Polaroid Corp., 472 B.R. at 34.
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delay or defraud creditors.”107  The Ninth Circuit holds that “the mere
existence of a Ponzi scheme is sufficient to establish actual intent” to
defraud.108  Thus, an equity receiver or bankruptcy trustee is not re-
quired to undertake the “badges of fraud” analysis, but is instead enti-
tled to a presumption of actual intent if he or she proves the existence
of a Ponzi scheme.
In the context of a Ponzi scheme, under the actual fraud theory, the
receiver or bankruptcy trustee may recover the entire amount paid to
the winning investor, including amounts which could be considered
“return of principal” (i.e., the initial investment in addition to the “fic-
titious profits”).109  However, neither the trustee nor the receiver is
typically successful in achieving this full recovery against the winning
investor.  And that is because there is a “good-faith defense” that al-
lows innocent winning investors to retain funds up to the amount of
the initial investment if they can demonstrate that they took the pay-
ments in good faith110 and for a reasonably equivalent value.111  When
the receiver or trustee is able to use the Ponzi presumption, his burden
of proving intent to defraud is satisfied; the burden then shifts to the
transferee to establish this good-faith defense.
Thus, drawing from this theory, one can conclude that investors of a
failed Ponzi scheme are almost always entitled to keep their principal,
107. Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. (In re Manhattan Inv. Fund Ltd.), 359 B.R. 510,
517–18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).  However, several courts have looked to cases interpreting sec-
tion 548 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to give meaning to their state statutes. See, e.g., PHP
Liquidating, LLC v. Robbins (In re PHP Healthcare Corp.), 128 F. App’x 839, 847 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“We need not discuss the [actual-intent fraudulent transfer] provisions of the Delaware Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act, because they are substantially the same as the relevant parts of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.” (citation omitted)); ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 365
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (“Thus, although ASARCO has not brought an action under section 548, the
Court may look to cases interpreting actual-intent fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Code to predict the standard that would be applied . . . .”).
108. Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2008) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also Field v. Lindell (In re Mortg. Store, Inc.), No. 10–90146,
2011 WL 3878355, at *2 (Bankr. D. Haw. Sept. 1, 2011) (“Evidence that the Debtor operated a
Ponzi scheme proves fraudulent intent. . . . The transfer is fraudulent under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)
and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 651C–4(a).”); Gowan v. Patriot Grp., LLC (In re Dreier LLP), 452 B.R.
391, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Applying the Ponzi scheme presumption, the Complaint here
sufficiently pleads the transferor’s actual fraudulent intent. Therefore, the motion to dismiss
Count III—actual fraudulent conveyance under [New York state law]—is denied.”).
109. Donell, 533 F.3d at 771.
110. A Ponzi scheme investor claiming good faith must meet an objective standard, and possi-
bly prove that a diligent inquiry would not have discovered the fraudulent purpose of the trans-
fer.  Hayes v. Palm Seedling Partners (In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp.), 916 F.2d 528, 535
(9th Cir. 1990).  This defense is conjunctive; the investor must show that she both exchanged
reasonably equivalent value and took in good faith.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8 (1984).
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but must return the “fictitious profits.”112  Case law supports this no-
tion.  “[E]very circuit court to address this issue has concluded that an
investor’s profits from a Ponzi scheme, whether paper profits or actual
transfers, are not ‘for value.’”113  The corollary to this is that a bank-
ruptcy trustee or equity receiver will not prevail against innocent in-
vestors in a Ponzi scheme under fraudulent transfer law for the return
of their principal because transfers of an investor’s principal are “for
value.”114  As stated by the Ninth Circuit, “[T]he general rule is that
to the extent innocent investors have received payments in excess of
the amounts of principal that they originally invested, those payments
are avoidable as fraudulent transfers . . . .”115
Lawsuits that receivers file against investors are considered to be
ancillary to the receivership action itself and are the equivalent of an
independent and separate lawsuit.116  Lawsuits filed in bankruptcy—
called “adversary proceedings”—are likewise separate from the main
bankruptcy proceeding.  Indeed, “[a]n adversary proceeding is essen-
tially a separate lawsuit within the context of bankruptcy case and has
all the attributes of a lawsuit, including due process service require-
ments as well as application, with some adaptation, of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”117  Thus, because the role of a receiver or
trustee in the aftermath of an investment scheme is to bring suits
under UFTA against those who unfairly profited by the schemer’s
wrongdoing, it would not be uncommon for the trustee or receiver to
be required to file hundreds of lawsuits to recover the fraudulent
transfers.118  Because of this enormous undertaking, the purpose in
establishing the existence of a Ponzi scheme makes perfect sense.  If
receivers and trustees are allowed to use that finding to invoke the
Ponzi presumption in all the cases related to the bankruptcy or receiv-
ership, they can save hundreds of thousands of dollars because they
will not be required to examine every transfer on a transaction-by-
112. In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed,
132 S.Ct. 2712 65 (2012) (quoting Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC
(In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), 424 B.R. 122, 141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
113. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Madoff Sec.), 476
B.R. 715, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
114. See Donell, 533 F.3d at 770.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. See, e.g., Pulitzer Pub. Co. V. Transit Cas. Co. (In re Transit Cas. Co.), 43 S.W.3d 293
(Mo. 2001) (holding that a lawsuit filed in a receivership case is independent of the receivership).
117. Dean v. Global Fin. Credit, LLC (In re Dean), 359 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2006).
118. Jordan Maglich, Madoff Ponzi Scheme, Five Years Later, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013, 10:30
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jordanmaglich/2013/12/09/madoff-ponzi-scheme-five-years-la
ter/ (stating that the trustee in the Bernard Madoff case “had filed thousands of lawsuits seeking
to increase the pot of money available to victims”).
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transaction basis.119  The savings, of course, will be passed on to the
victims of the fraud.
The Ponzi scheme presumption clearly provides a shortcut around a
transaction-by-transaction analysis of fraudulent intent for transfers
made by the schemer in which the entire operation constitutes a Ponzi
scheme.  But what if a receiver or trustee is not given this pleading
benefit because the scheme falls just shy of a classic Ponzi scheme?  Is
that fair to the victims of the fraud, most of whom have lost every-
thing they invested?  Is it equitable that results of the same case might
be different based on the jurisdiction of the suit alone?  Should the
Ponzi scheme presumption be so myopic in scope?  Cases discussed in
the next Part highlight this problem.
IV. THE PONZI PRESUMPTION PROBLEM
In 2014, a bankruptcy court in the Second Circuit heard a case in-
volving a Chapter 11 trustee’s partial motion for summary judgment,
in which the trustees sought to claw back “profits” transferred to two
defendants in an alleged Ponzi scheme.120  The issue in that case is
whether the trustee established as a matter of law that Marc Dreier,
the sole equity partner of Dreier LLC, operated a Ponzi scheme.121
The undisputed facts of the case show that, until he was arrested in
2008, Dreier regularly forged the signature of the CEO of a realty
company on promissory notes, sold them to innocent investors, and
deposited the profits into the LLC.122  Dreier was charged with securi-
ties fraud, mail fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.123  His in-
dictment alleges that he used the note proceeds to fund his law firm,
buy extravagant personal property and real estate, and “pay interest
and principal back to certain previous purchasers of the notes.”124
Dreier pled guilty and admitted to these allegations in his plea allocu-
tion.125  Despite these fraudulent acts, which affected several innocent
investors, the court found that the trustee failed to establish the exis-
tence of a classic Ponzi scheme as a matter of law and denied her
119. See SEC v. Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. (MSI), No. 2:11–CV–1165–BSJ, 2013 WL 4501088, at
*3 (D. Utah Aug. 22, 2013) (finding that “[t]he purpose of the Receiver’s motion is to gain an
early overall characterization of a Ponzi scheme in order to take future advantage of the ‘Ponzi
presumption,’ a pleading benefit in classic Ponzi scheme cases”).
120. Gowan v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C. (In re Dreier LLP), No. 08–15051 (SMB), 2014
WL 47774, at *1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2014).
121. Id.
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motion for partial summary judgment to recover the fraudulent
transfers.126
The court recognized as valid previous formulations of the Ponzi
scheme definition discussed above, but also articulated a four-factor
test that some courts use to determine whether a Ponzi scheme exists:
(1) deposits were made by investors; (2) the Debtor conducted little
or no legitimate business operations as represented to investors; (3)
the purported business operation of the Debtor produced little or
no profits or earnings; and (4) the source of payments to investors
was from cash infused by new investors.127
The court determined that the first three elements required little dis-
cussion because the parties did not dispute the accuracy of those as-
sertions.128  But the court ruled that the trustee failed to establish that
Dreier used new investors’ money to pay older investors.129  The court
explained that evidence to prove a Ponzi scheme must be admissible,
and the bulk of the trustee’s proof of the fourth element was not.130
First, Dreier’s indictment was inadmissible as hearsay.131  Second, a
judgment of conviction is admissible only to prove a fact essential to
the judgment.132  The court reasoned that Dreier could have admitted
to the four counts against him—money laundering, conspiracy, mail
fraud, and wire fraud—without admitting to operating a Ponzi
scheme.133  According to the court, the trustee failed to explain how a
Ponzi scheme was essential to those counts.134
The court held, as is consistent with other courts, that Dreier’s plea
allocution was admissible.135  Yet, while Dreier admitted to his fraud-
ulent note scheme in his plea, he never admitted that he used the pro-
ceeds of his fraud to pay earlier investors (as was charged in the
inadmissible indictment).136  All of the cases the trustee cited were—
at least in the court’s eyes—distinguishable from the case at bar; ei-
ther the fraudster admitted to the operation of a Ponzi scheme within
the realm of admissible evidence, or the defendant–transferees did not
truly dispute the Ponzi scheme’s existence.137
126. In re Dreier, 2014 WL 47774, at *1.
127. Id. at *9.








136. Id. at *10.
137. Id. at *11–12.
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Next, the court addressed Dreier’s admission in a deposition in an-
other proceeding, in which he admitted to running a “massive Ponzi
scheme.”138  The court found that it could not consider the deposition
admission because the defendants in the case at bar did not have an
opportunity to attend the deposition or cross-examine Dreier.139  Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the trustee’s only other evidence—va-
rious bank records evidencing transfers—failed to establish as a
matter of law that Dreier ran a Ponzi scheme because they, too, did
not show that Dreier paid earlier investors with later investors’
funds.140  In accord with its various findings, the court denied the trus-
tee’s motion for summary judgment as to the existence of a Ponzi
scheme.141  The court stated that its ruling did not dictate that the
trustee could not prevail at trial.142  But that very statement evinces
the problem.  A receiver or trustee seeks to establish a Ponzi scheme
as a matter of law in order to take advantage of the Ponzi presump-
tion, and for the express purpose of avoiding additional discovery and
trials where thousands of dollars will be spent relying on an inferential
process from circumstantial evidence to prove the transferor’s malign
intent in relation to the specific transfers at issue.
Thus, for the victims of the fraud in the Dreier case who were hop-
ing to recover the transferred funds, the court’s statement that the
trustee might prevail at a lengthy trial is essentially nugatory.  It is no
secret that the receiver, trustee, and their professionals get the first
slice of pie when the transferred funds are recovered.  But after an
expensive trial and a transaction-by-transaction analysis with no
pleading benefit to use in all of the other ancillary cases, the receiver’s
slice of pie grows substantially larger and, in the end, there may only
be a few crumbs left for the victims of the fraud.  Other cases around
the country illustrate this problem.
In In re National Audit Defense Network,143 the trustee of a Chapter
7 debtor brought fraudulent transfer claims to avoid transfers that the
debtor had made to individual corporate insiders.  The debtor in that
case “engaged in the selling of tax shelters and other products de-
signed to take advantage of people’s disdain for paying taxes.”144  As
noted by the court, the debtor’s products “were close to worthless,”
138. In re Dreier, 2014 WL 47774, at *12.
139. Id. at *12–13.
140. Id. at *13–14.
141. Id. at *14.
142. Id. at *12.
143. Leonard v. Coolidge (In re Nat’l Audit Def. Network), 367 B.R. 207 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2007).
144. Id. at 212.
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which ultimately lead to the bankruptcy filing.145  The bankruptcy left
thousands of customers “with unsupported and unsupportable tax
positions.”146
In the fraudulent transfer lawsuit, the trustee sought to avoid ap-
proximately $5 million in transfers to the insider defendants.147  One
of the issues before the court was whether the transfers at issue were
made with actual intent to defraud.148  A “full trial” was held on the
matter, but some of the participants of the fraudulent scheme refused
to testify, having elected early on to invoke the Fifth Amendment with
respect to any question related to the scheme.149 Accordingly, trial
was conducted under an alternate testimony rule, whereby the trustee
was required to submit direct testimony by declaration and then make
the declarants available for cross-examination.150
At trial, the trustee painted a “grim picture of an enterprise run
primarily to bilk gullible taxpayers out of their hard-earned
money.”151  However, the court made note that this was “technically
not a Ponzi scheme,” but rather a business “designed to maximize
sales of dodgy tax products through high-pressure sales tactics and
overblown advertising, all to the benefit of the defendants.”152  The
court also found that the products sold were “bogus or unlawful.”153
Nonetheless, the trustee’s forensic accountant testified that the
debtor’s tax scams could be compared with a Ponzi scheme:
[The debtor] offered unrealistic tax savings to customers, which its
representatives knew could never be delivered as promised. . . .  Al-
though not a classic Ponzi scheme in the sense that new money was
the source of paying earnings on prior money, [the debtor] had
many characteristics of a Ponzi scheme. [The debtor] utilized cus-
tomer payments to fund extensive advertising services to attract
new customers for its tax products and services. . . .  [The debtor]
spent most of this money for an increased telemarketing presence
and never produced adequate resources to do the tax return work it
had promised customers . . . .
. . . [The debtor] was able to survive for the period 2001 to its
demise because it took the majority of its receipts on the premise
that it would perform future services which were never performed.
The receipts for future services were then utilized for sales and
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 212–13.
148. Id. at 213.
149. In re Nat’l Audit, 367 B.R. at 213.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 214.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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boiler-room operations.  The resources needed to perform the fu-
ture services required of the company were never set aside or ade-
quately funded.  [The debtor] . . . was a boiler room fraud scheme; it
was not a legitimate accounting firm . . . .  [The debtor] masked the
nature of its operations and represented itself to be a solvent com-
pany through the use of improper revenue-recognition procedures,
which were not in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles.154
Moreover, the trustee’s forensic accountant further testified that the
debtor was insolvent “during all relevant periods.”155
Because the debtor enterprise was not technically a Ponzi scheme,
the court was required to examine the intent of the debtor through
circumstantial evidence and inferences, because “it will be the rare
case in which the debtor testifies under oath that he or she intended to
defraud creditors.”156  In this regard, the court discussed the “badges
of fraud”—i.e., the “recurring actions that historically have been asso-
ciated with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.”157
The court then examined the eleven badges of fraud found in Ne-
vada’s version of the UFTA, pointing out that the list is nonexclu-
sive.158  In doing so, the court analyzed the specific transfers at issue:
(1) when the transfers were made; (2) to whom they were made; (3)
the transferee’s relationship to the transferor; (4) whether there was
collusion on the part of the transferee; (5) the sort of “value” given in
return for the transfers; and (6) the effect of the transfers on the credi-
tors’ recoveries.159
After examining the specific transfers at issue, and after two days of
trial and argument, the court held that the trustee met his burden of
showing that the transfers were fraudulent and that they were made
with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.160  Clearly,
the court came to the correct conclusion, but the case also reveals the
underlying problem: if the trustee brings other fraudulent transfer ac-
tions against parties who profited from the scheme, will she be re-
quired to go through the same badges-of-fraud analysis to examine
each specific transaction she alleges was fraudulent because the
scheme was not technically a Ponzi scheme? That is what one judge
held recently in a federal receivership case out of the district of Utah.
154. Id. at 214–15.
155. In re Nat’l Audit, 367 B.R. at 215.
156. Id. at 219.
157. Id. at 220.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 220–21.
160. Id. at 213–14.
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In that case, the SEC filed a complaint in 2011 against Management
Solutions, Inc. (MSI) and its two principals, Wendell and Allen Jacob-
son (the Jacobsons), alleging that they had “operated [MSI] as a wide-
scale Ponzi scheme since at least January 1, 2008.”161  The scheme took
in more than $200 million from about 225 investors, and is likely one
of the largest financial frauds in Utah history.162  In the complaint, the
SEC states that the case involves affinity fraud, in which members of a
group are solicited for investments because of their shared bonds of
trust.163  What follows is a brief summary of the court’s findings of
fact.
Wendell created MSI in 1991 to facilitate his activities as a real es-
tate investor and manager.164  In return for investing in MSI, the Ja-
cobsons granted investors an interest in real property or, alternatively,
characterized the funds received as loans.165  The Jacobsons promised
investors 5–8% returns on their investments, and induced later victims
to invest by boasting that MSI had never defaulted on a promised
monthly payment to earlier investors.166  The court explained the
scheme as follows:
While not always followed by the Jacobsons, there seems to have
been a general pattern for raising money from MSI investors.  An
“underperforming” apartment complex or other property would be
located. An investor LLC would be organized.  A property-owning
LLC would be organized.  An investor would acquire a defined per-
centage in the investor LLC.  The Jacobsons (or a Jacobson entity)
would acquire a percentage interest in the investor LLC—often fifty
percent, sometimes more or less—with the representation that, like
the other investors, such was a cash investment by the Jacobsons (or
a Jacobson entity). The investor LLC would then contribute capital
to the property-owning LLC and own one-hundred percent of the
property-owning LLC.167
In order to keep investors at bay and maintain control over the
properties and the funds, the Jacobsons created over 208 entities and
161. SEC v. Mgmt. Solutions, Inc. (MSI), No. 2:11–CV–1165–BSJ, 2013 WL 4501088, at *3
(D. Utah Aug. 22, 2013).
162. Tom Harvey, Alleged Ponzi Scheme Tied to Utah Father, Son Among Biggest, SALT LAKE
TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2011, 8:42 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/money/53124909-79/investors-law
suit-utah-investor.html.csp.
163. Id. (“Wendell Jacobson and Allen Jacobson both belong to The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, and appear to have used their membership and the connection arising there
. . . to find and obtain the trust of prospective investors.” (alteration in original) (quoting the
SEC’s complaint)).
164. MSI, 2013 WL 4501088, at *3.
165. Id. at *4.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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represented to their investors that each entity was completely self-sus-
taining and independent from the others.168  But when a particular
property failed to be self-sustaining—i.e., when it could not satisfy the
monthly returns promised to its investors—the Jacobsons would pay
the returns with funds received
from new investors in a newly-created “stand-alone” investment en-
tity, from borrowing on the assets of one entity to meet the obliga-
tions of another, or from selling a property owned by one Jacobson-
controlled entity to another Jacobson-controlled entity to produce
on paper a “profit” to the investors in the earlier entity.169
This was a classic Ponzi scheme on its face, one would think. Indeed,
as the court recognized, “Peter often paid Paul’s obligations.”170
The central hub of the enterprise was an entity owned by the Jacob-
sons called Thunder Bay Mortgage, Inc. (Thunder Bay).  Although
each entity had its own bank account, almost all investment funds
were commingled into, and funneled through, the Thunder Bay ac-
counts before being distributed to the appropriate property LLC,
where the funds would then be used to pay for management fees, re-
turns on investment, and other obligations.171  When an LLC’s ac-
count ran dry or had insufficient funds to pay monthly returns to
investor accounts, the money came from the Jacobsons’ grand piggy
bank, the Thunder Bay account, which consisted of money from inves-
tors of other LLCs the Jacobsons had created.172
When the Jacobsons had promised to make a capital contribution
to a particular investment entity, Thunder Bay would often transfer
funds to the entity’s account, immediately withdraw that payment
the next day, and substitute on the books a bookkeeping entry
showing that Thunder Bay had “borrowed” the sum and owed it to
the entity, and on the Thunder Bay books show it as a “note paya-
ble.” [sic]  Yet, there were no physical notes payable, no payment
date or dates on such notes or in the books, no interest rates—noth-
ing but bookkeeping entries.173
These “notes payable” reached over $103 million in 2010.174
Part of the Jacobsons’ scheme involved placing investor funds into
an entity to purchase real property, improve the property, create a
new entity consisting of new investor funds, cause the new entity to
make an offer to buy the property of the old entity, and cause the old
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. MSI, 2013 WL 4501088, at *4.
171. Id. at *5.
172. Id.
173. Id. (footnotes omitted).
174. Id.
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entity to accept the offer.175  The buyer entity was kept a secret, so the
original investors, perceiving a successful investment and transaction
with a separate non-MSI entity, would roll their profits from the sale
into a new investment entity.176  Additionally, sometimes a “straw
man” associate would purchase a property with Thunder Bay funds,
and the Jacobsons would then create a new entity with investor funds,
cause the entity to buy the property from the straw man, and keep
some of the purchase price as “fees.”177
Other than for bookkeeping purposes, the Jacobsons treated the
multitude of MSI investment entities as a family, or in short, as one
enterprise.  Generally, monies from multiple operations, banking,
sales, and rents were swept into Thunder Bay accounts and divided
up from there to meet the multiple demands of multiple MSI enti-
ties.  Most funds from multiple sources were commingled in Thun-
der Bay and consequently most lost their individual identity as to
source.178
As a result of the Jacobsons’ fraudulent activities, Thunder Bay—
along with all of the other MSI straw entities—became increasingly
insolvent.179  In 2010, a confidential informant alerted the SEC, which
led to its investigation and the eventual receivership.180
The court’s opinion was in response to the receiver’s motion for
findings regarding the existence of a Ponzi scheme.181  The motion was
filed in the main receivership proceeding. At the time the receiver
filed the motion, there were over forty ancillary lawsuits filed for
fraudulent transfers and other causes of action.182  Thus, the receiver’s
purpose in filing the motion and pursuing the court’s finding of the
existence of a Ponzi scheme was to allow the receiver to use that find-
ing to invoke the Ponzi presumption in all of the MSI ancillary
cases.183  Such a finding would clearly benefit the receivership estate
as a whole because all those entities that profited as a result of the
fraud would likely suffer and an adverse judgment of avoidance and
would be required to turn over the profits for the benefit of the receiv-
ership estate.
175. Id. at *6.





181. Motion for Findings Regarding the Existence & Start Date of a Ponzi Scheme & for
Approval To Pool Claims & Assets, SEC v. Mgmt. Solutions, Inc., 2013 WL 4501088 (D. Utah
filed Nov. 13, 2012) (No. 2:11–CV–1165–BSJ).
182. MSI, 2013 WL 4501088, at *6.
183. Id.
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Accordingly, the main issue in the case was “whether the Jacobsons’
investment scheme, MSI, can be classified, from the beginning, as a
‘Ponzi scheme.’”184  The court noted, like many others, that no abso-
lute list of Ponzi scheme elements exists.185  Instead, courts look for a
pattern of conduct evidencing “any sort of inherently fraudulent ar-
rangement under which the debtor–transferor must utilize after-ac-
quired investment funds to pay off previous investors in order to
forestall disclosure of the fraud.”186
The court then went on a detailed excursion of available case law,
examining the various definitions and descriptions of Ponzi schemes
throughout the circuits to identify a common theme.187  It concluded
that a receiver must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, two
elements to establish the existence of a Ponzi scheme: (1) “the sine
qua non of a Ponzi scheme: that returns to earlier investors were paid
by funds from later investors”; and (2) “that returns to investors could
not be paid by the underlying business venture.”188
Other factors, though [nonessential] to the definition of a Ponzi
scheme, have been used by courts to decide if an investment scheme
fits into the Ponzi definition.  These include the promise of large
returns; the promise of returns with little to no risk; the promise of
consistent returns; the delivery of promised returns to earlier inves-
tors to attract new investors; the general insolvency of the invest-
ment scheme from the beginning; the secrecy, exclusivity, and/or
complexity of the investment scheme; and the general stability of
the investment scheme, among other factors.  Although the pres-
ence or absence of these factors does not [necessarily] make or
break a Ponzi scheme, these factors are typically present in Ponzi
schemes.189
Miraculously, the court ruled that the receiver had not proven the
existence of a Ponzi scheme.190  It reasoned that the “maze of facts
and transactions” involved made it unique and incomparable to
Charles Ponzi’s original scheme or to Madoff’s scheme which, unlike
the court’s conclusions about MSI, was “an assetless shell” from the
beginning.191  With 208 entities involved, the court reasoned that there
were hundreds of transactions “which may involve some innocent or
184. Id.
185. Id. at *7.
186. Id. (quoting Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, LP (In re Bayou Grp.,
LLC), 362 B.R. 624, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)).
187. Id. at *7–19.
188. MSI, 2013 WL 4501088, at *19 (citations omitted).
189. Id. (footnotes omitted).
190. Id. at *22.
191. Id. at *20.
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some culpable participants,” and found it “difficult to characterize all
of such transactions as Ponzi-related.”192  It explained that it would be
“inappropriate” to apply the Ponzi scheme presumption to all securi-
ties fraud cases, and doing so here might penalize innocent transferees
“not for Ponzi-related and inappropriate action on their part, if any,
but for the Jacobsons’ actions, not their own.”193  The court denied the
receiver’s request that it declare the MSI enterprise a Ponzi scheme,
reasoning as follows:
Often it seems, depending on the time and context, a particular
transaction [involving MSI] might be subject to a “Ponzi presump-
tion” which itself may be refutable, and at other times, depending
on the time and context, another particular transaction may not.
. . . As to intervening objectors and others who may be subject to
claw back . . . [e]ach [transaction] needs to be examined on an indi-
vidual basis. . . .
. . . [Presumption] is not a shortcut or substitute for proof. . . .
It seems to me that the “Ponzi presumption”, [sic] in equity, as to
third parties, should be of limited use—indeed, only in those cases
as blatant and as plain as the original Charles Ponzi case and the
more recent Madoff case: assetless and fraudulent from day one.
This is not that case.  The Receiver asserts this was a Ponzi
scheme from the beginning . . . and the intervenor objectors assert
this was not a Ponzi scheme at all.  In a sense, each is correct. De-
pending on time, circumstance, and transaction, the Jacobson enter-
prise has, of course, many Ponzi characteristics which often come
and go depending on time, circumstance, money source, and
transaction.
. . . [The split personality of MSI] compels us in future actions by
the Receiver to look at transactions closely, at the specific facts and
circumstances of each transaction, free from any alleged, all-em-
bracing presumption, but footed on whether a target of the Re-
ceiver’s action has received funds or assets knowingly, unfairly, or
unlawfully.194
The court’s decision is troubling; it made findings of fact which
clearly establish both of the elements a receiver must prove to invoke
the Ponzi scheme presumption.  First, it was undisputed that earlier
investors were paid with the funds of later investors—i.e., the classic
“rob Peter to pay Paul” scenario.  Indeed, Thunder Bay often trans-
ferred later-received, commingled funds of new investors to an ac-
count of an earlier-created LLC (funded by older investors) so that
the LLC could pay its promised returns to its investors, as its funds
were insufficient to do so.  In addition, the Jacobsons regularly created
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. MSI, 2013 WL 4501088, at *21–22.
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new entities, funded solely with new investor money, to purchase
property from older LLCs, thereby paying the old investors with the
new investors’ money.  With its finding that all of MSI’s entities oper-
ated as essentially one economic unit, the court should have found
that the facts established the first requirement.
Second, the court’s finding that Thunder Bay often “covered” for
the other entities while issuing promissory notes, coupled with the fact
that Thunder Bay became increasingly insolvent as a result of this re-
lationship, supports the court’s second required element.  The entities
comprising MSI—which the court found was a single enterprise—
transferred their insolvency into Thunder Bay (also part of the single
enterprise) and were unable to fund returns to investors from their
“underlying business venture.”
Finally, in addition to satisfying the court’s stated requirements, the
MSI scheme also exhibited several of the court’s suggested “typicali-
ties” of a Ponzi scheme.  First, while the Jacobsons did not promise
investors unusually high returns, they did represent to later investors
that they offered absolutely consistent monthly returns with little to
no risk by explaining that they had never defaulted with earlier inves-
tors.  Second, the Jacobsons’ boastful representations induced new in-
vestors to enter the scheme and help fund the enterprise.  Finally, the
Jacobsons engaged in secretive and complex strategies to keep inves-
tors at bay.  As the majority of investors were laypeople who simply
trusted the Jacobsons, the complexity of the scheme made it very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for the average person to uncover the fraud.
The Jacobsons created 208 “separate” entities so their scheme could
function under the radar.
In short, this court clearly ignored its own findings of fact under its
stated rules of law to conclude that MSI was not a Ponzi scheme.  But
the most troubling aspect of the opinion is that the court overlooked
the resulting consequences of its opinion and the impact its decision
would have on the receivership estate and its victims.  The purpose of
the receiver’s motion in the main receivership proceeding was to gain
an early overall characterization of the fraud as a Ponzi scheme in
order to take advantage of the Ponzi presumption.  Such a characteri-
zation at an early stage would have given the receiver a pleading ben-
efit in all ancillary cases in which he sought disgorgement of profits
from earlier investors who received funds contributed by later inves-
tors. But the court made it clear that “[a]n effort to apply such a
‘Ponzi presumption’ in all securities fraud cases which have some
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Ponzi scheme characteristics is inappropriate.”195  Why is applying the
presumption in all securities fraud cases inappropriate?  Applying the
presumption beyond classic Ponzi scheme cases ensures that those
who “profited” from similar schemes will be expected to turn over
their profits just like “winners” in Ponzi scheme cases.
If other courts follow the MSI holding, future trustees and receivers
will be able to take advantage of the Ponzi presumption “only in those
cases as blatant and as plain as the original Charles Ponzi case and the
more recent Madoff case: assetless and fraudulent from day one.”196
This should not be the case and this holding should not be followed.
V. EXPANDING THE PRESUMPTION
Cases like MSI, National Audit, and Dreier highlight the problem
associated with the narrow application of the Ponzi presumption.
First, because the descriptions and characterizations of a Ponzi scheme
are nebulous, there is great uncertainty for receivers and trustees ap-
pointed to take control of the fraudulent enterprise.  Would the MSI
scheme be labeled a Ponzi scheme under a court in the Second Cir-
cuit’s “any sort of inherently fraudulent arrangement under which the
debtor–transferor must utilize after-acquired investment funds to pay
off previous investors in order to forestall disclosure of the fraud” def-
inition?197  What about the Eighth Circuit court’s description: “a
multi-client investment arrangement executed over time, in which ini-
tial investors’ infusions are wrongfully siphoned off, the fund never
maintains enough cash to meet all its obligations, and the earlier cli-
ents’ realization on investment is funded by later clients’ infu-
sions”?198  If courts in those jurisdictions affixed the Ponzi label to the
MSI scheme, would the victims of that scheme receive a greater distri-
bution?  The answer is an unequivocal “yes.”  Those who profited
would have been required to turn over their winnings, and it would
have saved the receiver from an expensive and complex transaction-
by-transaction assessment.
195. Id. at *20.
196. Id. at *21 (emphasis added).
197. Bayou Superfund, LLC v. WAM Long/Short Fund II, L.P. (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 362
B.R. 624, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added).
198. Stoebner v. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. (In re Polaroid Corp.), 472 B.R. 22, 33 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2012) (quoting Manty v. Miller & Holmes, Inc. (In re Nation-Wide Exch. Servs., Inc.),
291 B.R. 131, 148 n.20 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003)); see also Meeks v. Red River Entm’t of Shreve-
port  (In re Armstrong), 285 F.3d 1092, 1093 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[i]n a Ponzi
scheme, the operator promises investors returns on their investment which the operator intends
to pay from funds provided by the underlying business venture”).
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In addition to the problem of unpredictability, limiting application
of the presumption to only those cases “as blatant and as plain as the
original Charles Ponzi case and the more recent Madoff case”199 is
harmful and highly prejudicial to the victims of the underlying fraud.
The bankruptcy and receivership processes are not just reserved for
failed Ponzi schemes.  They are oftentimes used to redress the conse-
quences of similar investment frauds.  To that end, there are still
“losers” and “winners” associated with fraudulent schemes.  In other
words, there are still victims deprived of property by fraud and others
who have benefited because of this fraud.  While the winnings may
not have necessarily come directly from the losers’ pockets, there are
still investors and other participants who have profited from the finan-
cial wrongdoing.  Expanding the presumption enables trustees and re-
ceivers to redress the victims of the fraud by recovering assets against
those who profited from the wrongdoing.  A few courts appear to be
recognizing this benefit.
A. Is Case Law Opening the Door for Expansion?
Case law invites an opportunity to extend the Ponzi scheme pre-
sumption beyond the scope of a “classic” Ponzi scheme.  In In re
NorVergence, Inc.,200 a New Jersey bankruptcy court addressed the
defendants’ motion to dismiss against NorVergence’s bankruptcy trus-
tee.201  The defendants were thirty-four leasing companies.202
NorVergence held itself out as a provider of “low cost” telecommu-
nications services to small businesses and organizations.203  Its core
product was the “Matrix Box.”204  NorVergence leased the “magic
box” to its customers for many times its retail value while representing
that it would help them to save on their phone and internet billing.205
But that was a lie. The Matrix Box was nonfunctional.  It was nothing
more than a mix of standard routers that helped connect equipment to
long-distance providers’ lines and did nothing to lower the customers’
telephone bills.206  NorVergence’s lease agreements allowed it to as-
sign its interest in the equipment leases to third parties.207
199. MSI, 2013 WL 4501088, at *21.
200. Forman v. Salzano (In re NorVergence, Inc.), 405 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2009).
201. Id. at 716.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 719.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. In re NorVergence, 405 B.R. at 719.
207. Id.
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Consequently, after it signed its customers up for the services,
NorVergence assigned the lease agreements at discount rates to third-
party finance companies for quick cash.208  NorVergence would then
use that cash to perpetuate the fraud, to wit: “more call center payroll
to acquire new customers, and . . . perks for . . . the insiders.”209  But
when the Matrix Box and services were not provided to new custom-
ers at the contracted time, the customers defaulted on their lease
agreements.  As a result, the third-party finance companies engaged in
offsets (the subject of the trustee’s complaint), withholding up to fifty
percent of the amount due to NorVergence under the lease-assign-
ment agreements as a hedge against future first payment defaults.210
The lack of funds rendered NorVergence insolvent, and it collapsed
into bankruptcy.211
The trustee sought to avoid the setoffs by asserting that
NorVergence was a Ponzi scheme and the setoffs were fraudulent
transfers.212  Among other things, the trustee alleged that
NorVergence was able to provide a few early customers with “dis-
counted” services because it used the proceeds of contracts from new
customers to offset other costs and make the offers more attractive.
The finance companies, however, argued that a Ponzi scheme requires
“an effort to disguise new investor money as profits and to funnel that
new investor money to initial investors who earn outsized returns,”
and that the trustee had failed to make this allegation.213
In its holding, the court defined a Ponzi scheme as having four
elements:
(1) deposits were made by investors; (2) the Debtor conducted little
or no legitimate business operations as represented to investors; (3)
the purported business operation of the Debtor produced little or
no profits or earnings; and (4) the source of payments to investors
was from cash infused by new investors.214
The trustee contended that he met these elements, arguing the
following:
The original victims were the early customers: they unsuspectingly
invested in the scheme by being duped into expensive five year
leases for a piece of equipment of tangential value, the matrix box.
Their cash investment, however, was created by the Leasing Com-
panies who immediately monetized the customer leases creating fast




212. In re NorVergence, 405 B.R. at 722.
213. Id. at 728–29.
214. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
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cash (investor money for NorVergence).  That money . . . was ex-
pended almost exclusively on the capture of new customers (vic-
tims) creating new cash for providing some telephone service
(return on investment) to old customers and for lining the pockets
of the principals.215
The court then explained:
Case law has revealed that a clever twist on the Ponzi concept will
not remove a fraudulent scheme from the definition of Ponzi.  In
other words, even if Debtor’s business operations do not exactly
match the description of a Ponzi Scheme, the Trustee can still con-
tinue to characterize the business model as a Ponzi Scheme thereby
meeting the intent prong of the fraudulent transfer or conveyance
Counts.216
The court did not classify NorVergence as a Ponzi scheme because
such a determination would require findings of fact outside of the mo-
tion presented.217  Nor did the court indicate whether a finding that
the debtor’s business operated a comparable fraudulent enterprise
could be used in all adversary proceedings brought by the trustee to
demonstrate the intent prong of the fraudulent transfer.  Nonetheless,
its holding is promising.  It invites courts to expand the Ponzi pre-
sumption beyond the scope of a “classic” Ponzi scheme.
Four years after In re Norvergence, an Illinois bankruptcy court de-
cided a motion to dismiss in the bankruptcy of Equipment Acquisition
Resource (EAR).218  In an earlier proceeding, the court had deter-
mined that the facts involved did not “fit the classic Ponzi scheme
model; the defendant is not an investor and the complaint itself al-
leges that EAR was in the legitimate business of ‘refurbishing and sell-
ing high-tech machinery.’”219  Although the court declined to find that
EAR was a Ponzi scheme and apply the presumption, the important
aspect of the case is that the Illinois court indicated its willingness to
expand the Ponzi scheme presumption to “Ponzi-like” schemes.220
Other courts are amenable to modifying the Ponzi scheme presump-
tion.  Recently, a Minnesota bankruptcy court decided to apply the
presumption in a rather unique way in the bankruptcy proceeding of
215. Id. at 729–30 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
216. Id. at 730 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 733.
218. Brandt v. PlainsCapital Leasing, LLC (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.), 502 B.R. 784
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013).
219. Brandt v. PlainsCapital Leasing, LLC (In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc.), 483 B.R. 823,
834 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (emphasis added).
220. In re Equip. Acquisition Res., 502 B.R. at 790 (“[T]he court noted [previously] that some
courts have expanded the Ponzi scheme presumption to schemes that are not within the defini-
tion of traditional Ponzi schemes. . . .  The court did not conclude, however, that this was a case
in which such an expanded definition would apply.”).
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the Polaroid Corporation.221  The key issue in that case was whether
the Ponzi scheme presumption applies to transfers outside the “opera-
tional core” of a Ponzi scheme.
Polaroid filed for bankruptcy in 2008.222  At the time, Polaroid’s
ownership was “traceable through an intermediate holding entity to
Petters Group Worldwide, LLC [(PGW)], itself a holding com-
pany.”223  PGW’s sole shareholder and CEO was Tom Petters (who
was also chairman of Polaroid), and PGW had entered bankruptcy
only a few months prior to Polaroid.224  Petters also operated Petters
Corporation, Inc. (PCI).225  Forensic accounting showed that Petters
had operated a massive Ponzi scheme using PCI, PGW, and several
other companies as instrumentalities of his fraud.226  Petters and his
coconspirators induced lenders to loan money to PCI for the purpose
of purchasing and reselling electronics in bulk.227  Petters forged docu-
ments for this purpose, and none of the purchases or sales ever took
place.228  PCI used the funds to pay other lenders in the Ponzi scheme
and to fund operations for PGW.
Petters, acting as Chairman of Polaroid, granted a security interest
in some of Polaroid’s trademarks to the “Ritchie Defendants” to se-
cure the preexisting debt belonging to Petters, PCI, and PGW.229
When Polaroid filed for bankruptcy, the “Ritchie Defendants” as-
serted their secured claims to the trademarks in the proceedings.230
Polaroid’s trustee moved for summary judgment, seeking to avoid Pet-
ters’ grant of this security interest as actually fraudulent to Polaroid’s
creditors.231  The main issues in the case were whether the court
would adopt the Ponzi scheme presumption and, if so, whether it
would apply the presumption to avoid a transfer outside the “opera-
tional core” of the Ponzi scheme.232  The court recognized that “[t]he
question of whether a court may use the Ponzi scheme presumption as
urged is a matter of first impression in a narrow body of case law that
221. Stoebner v. Ritchie Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. (In re Polaroid Corp.), 472 B.R. 22 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 2012).




226. Id. at 27–28.
227. In re Polaroid, 472 B.R. at 27–28.




232. Id. at 32–33.
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has burgeoned only since 2007–2008.”233  And “thus far the courts
have recognized and applied the presumption only as to transfers
made by entities that directly purveyed the Ponzi schemes.”234
Notwithstanding the limited application of the presumption
adopted by various courts, the Polaroid court held that Polaroid’s
pledge was made in furtherance of the Ponzi scheme and, therefore,
the presumption applied.  Although Polaroid did not operate the
Ponzi scheme, Petters did, and his fraudulent intent was imputed to
Polaroid.235  While the defendants contended that the justification for
the presumption was absent—because a legitimate business (like Po-
laroid) will not “inevitably fail” like a Ponzi scheme would—the court
found that argument to be “deliberately myopic and unduly con-
strained.”236  It explained that “[t]he past operation of a freestanding
business by the ‘legitimate’ related entity and the abstract possibility
of continuing such an operation do not bar the application of the pre-
sumption.”237  It further stated:
The Trustee’s expanded conception of the presumption is premised
on common control within a larger structure.  When this is the gov-
erning consideration, the automatic inference of fraudulent intent is
made when the person in common control effects the transfer by the
entity extrinsic to the Ponzi scheme, but in order to further the
scheme as it has been maintained through the central entity.  Yes, the
creditors hindered, delayed, and defrauded by the transfer are not
the direct victims of the Ponzi scheme in its operation, i.e., investors
into the entity through which the scheme has been purveyed.  None-
theless, it is a readily-identifiable group: the creditors of the related
entity that makes the transfer for the benefit of the purveyor–entity.
The intent that is deemed via the inference is the intent to deprive
those parties of the value of their legal recourse against the debtor
with which they are in privity, i.e., the transferor that gives up its
own assets at the beck of the person in common control, to satisfy a
creditor of the purveyor–entity that is not a creditor of the
transferor–entity.238
The court also explained that there was nothing inappropriate
about applying the presumption to this case, as the “in furtherance”
requirement of transfers in a Ponzi scheme is act oriented, not struc-
ture oriented; just because the transferees were not victims of the core
scheme did not dictate a finding that “the basic willingness to
233. In re Polaroid, 472 B.R. at 33.
234. Id. at 32–33.
235. Id. at 40–41.
236. Id. at 40.
237. Id. at 41.
238. Id.
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prejudices others’ rights is absent.”239  In concluding, the court stated
as follows:
[A]s a matter of logic, judicial policy, and fundamental fairness, the
Ponzi scheme presumption can be applied to the Polaroid Corpora-
tion’s encumbrance of valuable intellectual property rights in favor
of the Ritchie Defendants.  Such an application does go beyond the
matrix of phenomena on which the presumption was first conceived;
but it does so on proper considerations of the basis and purpose of
the presumption.240
Cases like Polaroid and NorVergence expand prior case law apply-
ing the presumption.  In Polaroid, the court applied the presumption
to transfers made by an entity that did not operate the Ponzi scheme.
In NorVergence, the court indicated its willingness to expand the pre-
sumption to operations that have some hallmarks of Ponzi schemes,
but that otherwise fail to fall within the classic definition of a Ponzi
scheme.  Clearly, these courts recognize the advantages of the pre-
sumption and the benefit of applying the presumption in cases suffi-
ciently like the “classic” Ponzi scheme.
B. Expanding the Presumption Maximizes Distribution
to Victims of the Fraud.
Receivers and trustees are equipped with fraudulent transfer reme-
dies designed to redress the victims of fraudulent schemes.  When they
seek to recover transfers under the actual fraud theory, they only need
to prove one element: whether the debtor made the transfer with ac-
tual intent to defraud.  And when they can prove that the companies
now under their control operated as a Ponzi scheme, they are entitled
to a presumption of actual intent to defraud.  But this means that in
every other investment fraud case, including those that closely resem-
ble Ponzi schemes, trustees and receivers must undertake the “badges
of fraud” analysis.  This approach is difficult and unpredictable.  As
one bankruptcy court noted, “[P]roof of intent under a badges-of-
fraud analysis is not like a carnival dart game, where simply popping a
given number of balloons entitles one to the big prize.”241  More im-
portantly, proof of fraudulent intent outside of “classic” Ponzi scheme
cases requires courts to examine the suspicious transaction at issue.
For example, among the badges of fraud courts consider are (1)
gross inadequacy of the consideration provided by the transferee; (2)
239. In re Polaroid, 472 B.R. at 41–42.
240. Id at 42.
241. Sullivan v. Welsh (In re Lumbar), 446 B.R. 316, 331 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2011), rev’d, 457
B.R. 748 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011).
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a close relationship between the transferor and the transferee; (3) se-
crecy in the transfer between the transferor and the transferee; (4) the
transferor’s insolvency as a result of the conveyance to the transferee;
(5) a questionable transfer not in the ordinary course of business; and
(6) retention of control of the property by the transferor after convey-
ance to the transferee.242  These badges share a commonality: they all
involve analyzing a specific transaction vis-a`-vis the actual transferee.
So in a case like MSI, in which the receiver had already commenced
more than forty separate ancillary cases for the recovery of fraudulent
transfers when he filed his motion to establish the existence of a Ponzi
scheme, the court must examine each transfer on an individual basis
to determine intent.  The cost to the estate in producing evidence and
analyzing the objective circumstances of each individual transaction is
staggering.  Tying the badges of fraud to each transaction will substan-
tially dilute the estate and the recovery available for victims of the
fraud.  Moreover, if the presumption is defenestrated due to lack of
“classic” Ponzi scheme circumstances, is there now an affirmative de-
fense as to the profits the receiver or trustee seeks to recover?  As this
Article discussed, in Ponzi scheme cases, courts uniformly hold that an
investor—even if innocent—does not exchange reasonably equivalent
value for any payments received that represent fictitious profits.  But
does this mean that in cases like MSI—in which one can assume, for
the sake of argument, that the receiver could prove actual intent—
that there are no longer fictitious profits because it is not a “classic”
Ponzi scheme and, therefore, investors will be able to establish a de-
fense to the fraudulent transfer because they took the profits in good
faith and for reasonably equivalent value?  In an area where equity
reigns supreme, this should not be the law.
If the goal in both securities fraud receiverships and liquidation
bankruptcy is to maximize the return to creditors and victims and to
orchestrate a fair distribution of the liquidated assets, expanding the
actual fraud presumption beyond classic Ponzi schemes will achieve
this objective.  Proof of the existence and operation of a comparable
fraudulent enterprise, and a judicial finding to that effect, should be
sufficient to support an overall finding of intent on the part of the
purveyor or purveyors of the fraud to defraud contemporaneous or
future creditors of the enterprise.  Such an expansive sweep with re-
spect to all transfers flowing from the fraudulent enterprise is both fair
and equitable.
242. See, e.g., DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. Kontogiannis, 594 F. Supp. 2d 308, 320 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (listing badges of fraud analyzed by courts).
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First, because it is just a presumption, receivers and trustees will still
be required to make a showing that the entities now under their con-
trol operated a fraudulent scheme.  This will undoubtedly necessitate
an evidentiary hearing where all parties in interest, including those
that object to the finding of a fraudulent scheme, can participate. In
other words, expanding the presumption does not mean that trustees
and receivers will automatically be equipped with the presumptive
sword.  They will still be required to file a motion asking the court to
establish the existence of a fraudulent enterprise and allow them to
invoke the actual fraud presumption in all ancillary cases.  This pro-
cess allows all parties in interest to have their day in court.  The likely
scenario is that the “winners” will object to such a request, while the
“losers” will support it.
Along those lines, the trial court should be afforded substantial dis-
cretion to determine the existence of a fraudulent enterprise and the
application of the presumption.  Accordingly, establishing an absolute
list of required elements in order to prove the existence of fraud and
invoke the presumption would be impractical and would likely pro-
mote similar myopic decisions like the MSI case.  Instead, the trial
court should be able to consider several nonexhaustive factors in mak-
ing its determination.  This Article suggests the following considera-
tions: (1) whether the entities failed to observe corporate formalities;
(2) whether investment funds were commingled with personal funds;
(3) whether there were extensive intercompany transfers; (4) whether
insiders were receiving substantial, unreported gains; (5) whether the
operators induced investors to invest through exaggeration, lies, or de-
ceit; (6) whether the business or businesses were self-sustaining with-
out the infusion of other investments; (7) whether some of the returns
paid to old investors came from funds contributed by new investors;
(8) whether the entities engaged in secretive and complex strategies;
(9) whether the investments were unregistered; (10) whether the enti-
ties failed to keep proper paperwork; (11) whether the operators used
the funds to lead a lavish lifestyle; (12) whether investors were lied to
regarding the existence of their investments and their promised re-
turns; and (13) whether some investors profited at the expense of
other investors.
Furthermore, once a trustee or receiver meets her burden, even this
blanket finding of fraudulent intent will not automatically penalize in-
nocent action.  It is a presumption that has the effect of shifting the
burden of production of evidence on the ultimate fact over to the trus-
tee or receiver’s opponent.  The opposing party may rebut the pre-
sumption by demonstrating that she took in good faith and for
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reasonably equivalent value.  But just like “classic” Ponzi scheme
cases, those investors who profit from the financial wrongdoing should
help defray the losses of those victims who come out behind.  Why
allow this form of restitution to operate strictly in “classic” Ponzi
scheme scenarios?
Second, expanding the presumption beyond classic Ponzi scheme
cases avoids the unpredictability problems receivers and trustees ex-
perience when seeking a Ponzi scheme finding.  For example, in cases
such as MSI, where courts in other jurisdictions could have easily
reached a different conclusion and affixed the golden Ponzi-scheme
label to the fraudulent enterprise, the receiver will still be able to take
future advantage of an actual fraud presumption in all ancillary cases,
regardless if the enterprise now under his control operated as a classic
Ponzi scheme.  The purveyors of the MSI fraud cheated others. At
times, they robbed Peter to pay Paul.  They created fictitious entities
to disguise their fraud. Thus, a presumption that all transfers flowing
from the fraudulent enterprise is logical.
Finally, one of the fiduciary duties of trustees and receivers is to
conserve assets of the estate and maximize distributions to creditors.
That means investigating and litigating potential lawsuits that might
be brought on behalf of the entities now under their control.  But fail-
ure to perform these duties expeditiously subjects trustees and receiv-
ers to removal, forfeiture of fees, or, in some cases, liability for
damages.243  Equipped with a presumptive element of fraud to utilize
in claw-back actions will allow trustees and receivers to act diligently,
equitably, effectively, and efficiently as they fulfill their fiduciary du-
ties.  Without the presumption, the transaction-by-transaction assess-
ments will undoubtedly dilute the estate, and perforce will minimize
distributions to victims and creditors.  Victims of fraudulent schemes
have already received a demoralizing blow; they should not be pun-
ished further because of a label.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ponzi schemes and other investment frauds inevitably end up in
bankruptcy or receivership, leaving behind numerous victims—many
of whom invested their life savings in the scheme without any knowl-
edge of its fraudulent nature.  Although trustees and receivers can
sometimes recover some of the fraudulently acquired funds from the
assets of the perpetrators, in most cases, those assets fall woefully
243. See Ernst & Young v. Matsumoto (In re United Ins. Mgmt., Inc.), 14 F.3d 1380, 1386 (9th
Cir. 1994).
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short of the victims’ losses.  This leads to fraudulent transfer lawsuits
against those who are suspected to have profited from the
wrongdoing.
A transfer is fraudulent if it was made with the actual intent to de-
fraud.  But actual fraud is seldom proven by direct evidence.  Rather,
it is usually proven from inferences drawn from a course of conduct.
Generally, to determine whether circumstantial evidence supports an
inference of fraud, courts examine certain badges of fraud.  While
badges of fraud are helpful, the analysis requires individual examina-
tion of the specific transaction at issue, the effect of which diminishes
the returns to the victims of the fraud because of the substantial costs
involved in undertaking such assessments.  However, courts nation-
wide have recognized that simply establishing the existence of a Ponzi
scheme is sufficient to prove the perpetrator’s intent to defraud.  The
presumption provides receivers and trustees with a significant plead-
ing advantage and shifts the burden of showing the legitimacy of the
benefits received to the target.
Courts define Ponzi schemes differently.  The characteristics and
descriptions vary, which creates uncertainty for receivers and trustees
who are now required to take over the fraudulent enterprise and re-
cover assets for the victims of the fraud.  Expanding the actual fraud
presumption beyond classic Ponzi-scheme cases avoids uncertainty
and assists receivers and trustees in achieving a final, equitable distri-
bution of assets.  Courts like the one in MSI are missing the mark.
The focus should not be whether applying the presumption is fair to
those potential defendants who profited by the perpetrator’s wrongful
conduct.  Instead, the focus should be whether applying the presump-
tion will maximize the return to creditors and victims of the fraud.
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